![[THE WORLDPEACE SIGN]](wppin.gif)
![[THE WORLDPEACE SIGN]](pinquarter.jpg)
NO:
03-978, 03-990, 03-1022, 03-1023, 03-1049,
03-1069, 03-1070, 03-1079, 03-1082, 03-1083, 03-1084
IN
THE
SUPREME
COURT
OF
JOHN
WORLDPEACE
______________________________
Re:
Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyers Discipline v. John
WorldPeace, 269th District Court
______________________________________________________________________
SHORTHAND
RENDITION
REGARDING THE PROPOSED RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE AND
THE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE VS. WORLDPEACE
______________________________________________________________________
Filed by: John WorldPeace, Relator
John WorldPeace
2620 Fountainview,
Tel. 713-784-7618
Fax. 713-784-9063
TBA# 21872800
Attorney Pro Se
IDENTITY
OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete
list of all the parties and the names and addresses of all counsel in the
underlying lawsuit.
Relator (Respondent)
John WorldPeace
John WorldPeace
2620 Fountainview,
Houston
,
Tel. 713-784-7618
Fax. 713-784-9063
Attorney Pro Se
Respondent: Honorable James
R. Fry
Presiding Judge in the
Underlying Disciplinary Petition
(Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. John
WorldPeace, 269th District Court,
15th Judicial
District Court
Tel:
903-813-4303
Fax:
903-813-4304
Real Parties in Interest and
Parties to the Case. (Petitioner)
Commission
for Lawyer Discipline
J. G Molleston
State Bar of
1111 Fannin,
Houston
,
Tel:
713-759-6931
Fax: 713-752-2158
Attorneys for the Commission
for Lawyer Discipline
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THIS COURT:
SHORTHAND
RENDITION
REGARDING THE PROPOSED RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE AND
THE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE VS. WORLDPEACE
FOREWORD
The
Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure are in the process of being amended.
The lawsuit that the Commission for Lawyer Discipline filed against me
shows the unconstitutionality of many of the rules and the arbitrary application
of those rules to the detriment of the Respondent attorney.
In reality, the rules are full of injustices that serve neither the
public nor the Respondent attorneys.
If
the TRDP was enforced to the letter and every single violation of the TDRPC had
the potential of death penalty sanctions, then no person in this state would be
able to afford legal fees.
In order to compensate for the Draconian dictates of the TRDP, attorney
fees would have to double if not triple and the overall objective of the rules
to protect the public from the wrongful acts of attorneys would translate into
the end of legal services for everyone but the rich.
The
following is my perspective on the TRDP as they presently exist and as they have
been applied to me. These
comments are supported in many cases by challenges in the form of my
Applications for Writs of Mandamus that are presently before this court.
These applications show some of the major flaws in the rules.
In some cases, I have not filed an application because I believe that ten
applications against one presiding judge on any one case are more than enough to
show there is something wrong with the grievance process.
However, I am prepared to file those additional applications if
necessary.
I
have set up a website (www.johnworldpeace.net/indexsb.htm)
for the purpose of creating a dialogue about the injustices of the disciplinary
process in
The
TRDP is seriously flawed and cannot be fixed.
The core problem is the attempted integration of the TRDP with the larger
body of law both common and statutory in this state.
You cannot try a TDRPC violation in a vacuum,
1) because Rule 3.08 B ties the TRDP to the TRCP, 2) the law of legal
malpractice parallels the TDRPC and 3) suits for attorney fees trigger
grievances and so Rule 97a TRCP must be integrated with the TRDP.
The
reality is that only about forty-five disciplinary cases have been appealed in
the last eleven years during which time the current TRDP has been in effect.
The reason that there have been few appeals is because most attorneys
simply can’t afford to put their license on the line to challenge the
Commission for Lawyer Discipline. Consequently
they succumb to its injustice.
I,
on the other hand have no fear of the people who work in the grievance system.
Consequently, I have taken it upon myself to challenge every single
aspect of the system. I have laid
the foundation and preserved error on as many of the injustices of the system as
I could in the disciplinary petition filed against me.
For the first time, the court has a live case to hold up to the
TRDP to see how the TRDP works in fact.
These
matters would have reached this court earlier this year had it not been for the
procrastination of Judge Fry, the presiding judge in the underlying disciplinary
petition against me, who signed a Judgment of Disbarment against me on April 23,
2003, then set it aside on June 23, 2003, then two months later on August 27,
2003, signed a second Judgment for Disbarment.
Judge Fry did not hear my Motions for New Trial, JNOV, Motion to Vacate,
Modify or Clarify the Judgment for Disbarment or my Motion for Reheaing on the
Commisison’s Amended Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment until
There
was about 150 pages of facts and arguments (exclusive of exhibits) contained in
my collective motions and to which the Commission did not submit a single
written word in response.
On
Many
of the issues in this shorthand rendition were going to be adjudicated in the
underlying lawsuit by way of my cause of action for Declaratory Judgment.
However, as it stands now, Judge Fry through his attempted use of a
“mother hubbard” clause in his
ANALYSIS
OF SELECTIVE RULES OF THE
NOTE:
The cited rules are attached.
Exhibit
“H”
is a summary of the grievances.
1.06 Definitions:
1.06
Q (4) This Rule is apparently being eliminated in the proposed rules that are to
become effective January 1, 2004, but this rule is no different than Rule 8.01
(b) and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC which
both have to do with furnishing information to the State Bar in a grievance
matter. Rules 8.01(b) and
8.04(a)(8) are nothing more than back doors into Rule 1.06 Q (4).
So without a specific exclusion under Rule 1.06 Q (1) with regards to
Rule 8.01 (b) and Rule 8.04 (a) (8), Rule 1.06 (Q) (4) lives on.
There
are questions regarding these rules in my Application for Writ of Mandamus
(Cause No 03-1079). No attorney
should be sanctioned for invoking his or her rights against self incrimination
during the grievance investigatory process.
The
initial letter to an attorney following the filing of a grievance states that
the information may be turned over to law enforcement.
In addition, every grievance hearing begins with a warning to the
Respondent attorney regarding self incrimination.
Comment
2 to Rule 8.01 (b) TDRPC indicates that an attorney is not required to assert
his self incrimination rights verbally or in writing.
The right against self incrimination can be asserted by a refusal to
respond.
“This Rule is subject to the provisions of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions
of Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.
A person relying on such a provision in response to a specific or more
general demand for information, however, SHOULD do so openly and not use the
right of non-disclosure, as an unasserted justification for failure to comply
with this Rule.”
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and neither the
TDRPC nor the TRDP can infringe on its guarantees.
This is what Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and 8.01(b) and 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC are
all about. There are no overriding
state interests that can void a person’s constitutional rights against self
incrimination.
1.06 R.
Reasonable Attorney Fees
The
question here is whether or not attorney fees can be awarded for services
performed by the State Bar attorneys in prosecuting a disciplinary petition.
There is no case law on this point. I
challenged it in the underlying trial but I have not made it the subject of an
Application for Writ of Mandamus for now.
In
the underlying trial, Mr. Molleston, attorney for the Commission, testified that
no attorneys were hired by the Commission to prosecute the case against me and
that no outside attorneys were contracted by the Commission to prosecute the
case against me and no attorneys did pro bono work on the disciplinary petition
against me.
Therefore,
no attorney fees should have been awarded as sanctions in the prosecuting of the
underlying disciplinary petition against me.
Further,
Mr. Molleston testified that he makes $27 per hour working for the State Bar.
Judge Fry awarded attorney fees based on $150 per hour.
This would allow the State Bar to make a profit on fees awarded as
sanctions. There is
something wrong with giving the Commission for Lawyer Discipline this profit
incentive to pursue attorneys.
Rule 2.07
Duties of the Committees.
“Committees shall act through panels, as assigned
by the Committee chairs, to conduct investigatory hearings or evidentiary
hearings…all Committee panels MUST be
randomly selected by the chair.”
At
trial in the disciplinary petition against me, there were according to Mr. Mapes,
the senior investigator in Houston, two committees specifically assigned to him.
Each committee has three panels for a total of six panels.
Yet of the twelve grievances that have been processed by the State Bar
against me (six were tried), eight were assigned to the Alan Levine panel and
two to the Jim Adler panel.
(Exhibit
“A”)
The
wording used in Rule 2.07 is “MUST be randomly assigned”.
There is no way that eight out of twelve grievances can be randomly
assigned to ONE of six panels. There
was an outright manipulation of the assignment of the panels based on the fact
that Mr. Levine’s panel could be counted on to bring back a negative “just
cause” finding against me. Mr.
Levine stated in one grievance hearing that the Complainant “could
walk out the door and down the street and find any number of legitimate
attorneys.” This is an
undeniable statement of personal bias against me.
(This statement is on the grievance video and was part of the evidence at
trial.)
The
odds that ten out of twelve grievances could be randomly assigned to two out of
six panels is astronomical. I
objected to Mr. Adler being on one of my grievance hearings and Mr. Mapes
assigned a subsequent grievance to the Adler panel anyway; again to achieve a
negative “just cause” finding with a suspension or disbarment
recommendation.
This
is undeniable. Panel selection was
the subject of a Bill of Exception I created at trial due to Judge Fry allegedly
severing my Constitutional counterclaims at pre-trial.
(As
an aside, in his Second Judgment for Disbarment, Judge Fry said that he had
ruled for Rule 174 (b) separate trials as opposed to Rule 41 separate lawsuits.
This is nonsense and contrary to the pre-trial record.
If that were the case and there was to be a second trial on the
constitutional issues, there would be no point in my creating a Bill of
Exception in the TDRPC violations trial that had been severed by Judge Fry.
I would have just brought this issue up in the second trial in the
lawsuit. (see Cause No. 03-1049)
The
unfortunate thing, and this is critical, is that the case law has indicated that
a Respondent attorney has no rights of due process in the grievance
investigation process and therefore all these MUST dictates and time deadlines
and virtually everything in the TRDP are unenforceable and therefore
meaningless. (See Minnick v. State Bar of Texas; 790 S.W. 2d 87, 90 (Tex. App. – Austin
1990, writ denied) and Flume v. State
Bar of Texas; 974 S.W. 2d 55 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1998))
Think
about it. There is not one single
sanction available to a Respondent attorney for a single violation of the TRDP
by the Commission. There are no
enforcement provisions applicable to the Commission and therefore the whole body
of law is a vicious joke on the lawyers in
If
the Commission or its agents or employees violate the TRDP dictates, then there
are no repercussions of any kind. It
makes the whole TRDP a farce and along with the Rule 15.11 TRDP “immunity
provision” it allows the disciplinary process to take on a Draconian
Inquisition atmosphere.
What
you end up with is a witch hunt that can be prosecuted at will by malicious and
bad intentioned people based upon the most insignificant gripes of a disgruntled
client or a client who does not want to pay his attorney fees or
an opposing attorney in a live lawsuit who wants to use the TRDP to gain an
advantage in the lawsuit contrary to No. 15 in the TDRPC Preamble/Scope.
“Furthermore, the purpose of these rules can be
abused when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons.”
(Five
of the twelve grievances against me have to do with opposing parties and
attorneys in live lawsuits. This is
nonsense.)
(Exhibit
“H”)
Dawn
Miller filed suit on me for the State Bar in 1993 after the statute of
limitations had run. The suit was
poured out with prejudice.
(Exhibit
“C”) A year ago she added five
additional grievances to the underlying disciplinary petition against me
contrary to the “MUST file” with the Clerk of the Supreme Court dictates of
Rule 3.01 TRDP. Dawn Miller, Chief
Disciplinary Counsel, believes that she is above the law.
This is undeniable.
If
MUST does not mean MUST in regards to Rule 3.01 TRDP then what is the point of
using MUST in the statute? It might
as well read may or should or even shall or whatever you feel like.
Rule 2.09 Clarification of Inquires
and Complaints.
“The Chief Disciplinary Counsel shall examine each
such written statement and determine whether it constitutes an inquiry or a
complaint.”
The
problem is that Mr. Mapes, the investigator in eleven of the twelve grievances
filed against me, testified at trial that he
is not an attorney and that he had no understanding of the Preamble and
Scope of the TDRPC. No. 11 under
Preamble: Scope states; “The rules presuppose a larger legal context
shaping the lawyer’s role”
Mr.
Mapes, as a non-attorney, has no qualifications to determine whether a written
statement constitutes a complaint or an inquiry.
Rule 2.09 should mandate that an attorney must make these determinations.
A
non-attorney assigned as the gate keeper in disciplinary matters is really
ridiculous.
When
you follow this gate keeping function up with the ability of the Commission to
manipulate the committees and panels that hear the complaints (as they
undeniably did in my case; against the MUST dictates of Rule 2.07)
(Exhibit
“A”), you have a situation like mine where Mr. Mapes takes a frivolous
grievance and classifies it as a complaint and then manipulates the panel
assignment to achieve a negative “just cause” finding against me.
This is NOT a hypothetical case. This
is what undeniably happened to me; over and over again.
Rule 2.13
Disposition Upon a Finding of Just Cause.
“Should an investigatory panel find Just Cause, it
may, with the consent of Respondent, impose any Sanction available under these
rules except disbarment.”
Here
is another problem that happened to me. In
the Collins matter, the Committee offered me a sanction of a public reprimand.
My choice was to take the public reprimand in the State Bar Journal or
be sued and receive a public reprimand in the public records of the Harris
County District Clerk anyway.
Now
consider that a non attorney, Mr. Mapes, has determined that a written statement
is a complaint and then maliciously forwarded it to a committee that is biased
against me and then an offer is made to me for a public reprimand which I either
accept or face the public reprimand of a disciplinary petition anyway.
No one can deny the unconstitutionality in this kind of arbitrary system.
Rule 2.15
Confidentiality
The
number one problem here is that Complainant Collins and her attorney McNab
Miller violated the confidentiality rule. In
Collins pro se original answer and in Miller’s amended answer for
Collins, they referenced the grievance against me and even lied about what was
going on in the grievance process.
(Exhibit
“B”) I filed a grievance against
Miller but it was rejected.
(Exhibit
“D”)
The
reality is that there is no remedy for an attorney against a Complainant for
violation of this Rule, or any Rule for that matter.
The
real question for the Supreme Court is whether a violation of the
confidentiality rule overrides the common law regarding “slander”; which
says that a slander cause of action cannot be maintained for anything that is
stated in relation to a lawsuit. So
was it OK for Miller and Collins to violate Rule 2.15 because they did it within
my lawsuit against Collins for my fees?
Collins
and her attorney violated Rule 2.15. This
is just another area where it is almost impossible to reconcile the TRDP which
includes the TDRPC’s and the common and statutory law.
It
makes the prohibitions in Rule 2.15 inapplicable to the Complainant and
potentially deadly to the Respondent attorney.
Rule 3.01 Disciplinary Petition
“The Disciplinary Petition MUST be filed with, the
Clerk of the Supreme Court of
Per
my Application for Writ of Mandamus (Cause No. 03-0990) the Commission added on
five additional complainants to the underlying disciplinary petition filed
against me without filing them with the Clerk of the Supreme Court per Rule 3.01
TRDP. Consequently, Judge Fry had no
jurisdiction to hear these additional grievances because he was not assigned to
hear them by the Supreme Court per Rule 3.02 TRDP.
“The Supreme Court shall promptly appoint an active
district court judge who does not reside in the Administrative Judicial Region
in which the Respondent resides to preside over in the case.”
Dawn
Miller, believing she was above the law, in 1993 filed suit on me after the
statute of limitations had run. The
suit was poured out with prejudice.
(Exhibit
“C”) Maintaining her pattern and
practice of violating the law, Dawn Miller added five complainants to the
underlying lawsuit as opposed to filing them with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court. There is no denying this.
There is no excuse. There is
only Dawn Miller’s arrogance.
Further,
when this matter came up in pre-trial, Judge Fry asked Mr. Molleston to respond
to my Plea to the Jurisdiction regarding Rule 3.01 TRDP.
Mr. Molleston stated to the court that in the six years he had been at
the State Bar he had violated Rule 3.01 on several occasions by adding
Complainants to existing disciplinary petitions.
I
filed a Motion to Compel Mr. Molleston to produce those cases (there are none in
the case law with this fact pattern) and Judge Fry refused to hear my motion.
There can be no doubt that Judge Fry knows that no such cases exist and
that Mr. Molleston will be subject to being fired and disbarred if Judge Fry
compels him to produce cases which he does not have.
It would show he lied to the court. I
filed a grievance against Mr. Molleston on this issue.
Guess what? It was denied.
(Exhibit
“E”)
The
word MUST leaves no room for discretion. MUST
means MUST unless of course you are Dawn Miller, General Counsel for the State
Bar and Chief Disciplinary Counsel. Then
MUST means whatever you want it to mean.
Further
Rule 3.01 does not authorize more than one complainant to be filed with one
petition. Under the proposed Rules,
multiple Complainants are allowed.
The
problem is that in my trial, three or four people were struck from the jury
panel when asked if they thought that six complainants meant that I had in fact
done something wrong and they answered in the positive without having heard a
scintilla of evidence.
No
one can question the prejudice against an attorney when multiple Complainants
are tried together. By trying the
Complainants together, three or four grievances based on a minor infraction of
the TDRPC (not calling a client enough) are put together in one case.
Any one grievance would not be able to fly by itself.
Yet together they give an appearance of wrong doing simply based on the
number of complainants in the lawsuit.
I
allege that Dawn Miller was afraid that the original disciplinary petition
against me, which only included Collins and was barred by res judicata and would be dismissed by Judge Fry.
The disciplinary petition was bolstered with five additional grievances
filed eighty days after the original disciplinary petition was filed in order to
prevent the Collins case from being poured out on Summary Judgment.
Rule 3.08 Additional Rules of
Procedure in the Trial of Disciplinary Actions
“B.
Except as varied by these rules, the
Rule
3.08(b) is where there are a lot of problems with the TRDP.
This is where everything becomes cloudy and bright lines do not exist.
Two examples follow.
1)
Is Rule 97a TRCP varied by Rule 15.04 and 15.05 TRDP.
(Cause No. 03-1049, 03-1069, 03-1070) The real problem here is whether or
not a suit for fees by the Respondent attorney can be severed under Rule 41 TRCP
or even separated under Rule 174 (b) TRCP from the TDRPC violations.
Especially when there is an award of restitution all based on the same
underlying action. It makes no sense
at all for fee disputes and their associated TDRPC violations to be tried
separately.
2)
Rule 3.09 Judgment. The
problem in my case is that Judge Fry set a disbarment date prior to the date
when his plenary power expires. This
resulted in my defacto disbarment. Judge
Fry admitted this.
(Exhibit
“F”)
This issue regarding actual disbarment date is not addressed in the TRDP.
(Cause No. 03-1022)
Rule 3.10 Hearings on Sanctions
The
problem here is that it is nonsense that every violation of the TDRPC could have
“death penalty” disbarment consequences.
It is wrong that there is no range of punishment to limit the presiding
judge’s range of sanctions. This
is especially true when some of these judges who are appointed by the Supreme
Court have no familiarity with Disciplinary Petitions.
There is no way that failing to call a client can be as serious as taking
the client’s trust funds.
In
the underlying lawsuit, I won the lawsuit that Collins had filed against Alvin
Arbuckle
(Exhibit
“I”) and that I was hired to prosecute
(Exhibit
“J”).
Yet I was disbarred in part for not keeping her informed.
This is nonsense.
This
issue becomes even more important considering the fact that a Judgment for
Disbarment cannot be superseded or stayed per Rule 3.14 TRDP.
Rule 3.12
Restitution
The
only client property that restitution concerns is trust funds as delineated by
Rule 1.14 (a, b, c) TDRPC. Rule 3.12
does not specifically state this. However,
in my case, Judge Fry ordered restitution to three complainants when there was
no submission to the jury regarding Rule 1.14 TDRPC. (Cause No. 03-1069, 03-1070)
The
first thing that is told to a Complainant in a grievance hearing is that the
Commission is not empowered to get their money back.
So this means that only Rule 1.14 TDRPC trust funds are subject to
restitution under Rule 3.12.
In
my case, Judge Fry awarded Restitution without a Rule 1.14 jury finding that I
had taken trust monies with regards to three Complainants.
A
secondary issue here relates to the fact that I had sued Collins in Cause No. 2000-31108, WorldPeace v. Collins, 281st District
Court, Harris County, Texas and a final judgment had been entered in that
case a month prior to trial in the underlying disciplinary case.
Collins had not counter sued for restitution in the WorldPeace v.
Collins lawsuit and therefore was barred by Rule 97a (res judicata) from
suing for it in the underlying disciplinary petition.
(Cause No. 03-1084) Yet Judge
Fry awarded Collins restitution.
(Exhibit
“G”)
Rule 3.14 No Supersedeas
“A district court judgment of disbarment or an
order revoking probation of a suspension from the practice of law cannot be
superseded or stayed.”
As
far as I know there are no other examples in the civil law which enforce a
judgment and allow no bail, stay or supersedeas bond to maintain the status quo
during appeal.
The problem with Rule 3.14 is that
it does not allow for an expedited appeal.
The questions of law can be the subject of an Application for Writ of
Mandamus but that is limited.
A
lawyer could be stopped from practicing law for years while he waits to be heard
in the appeals court and if the disbarment is reversed, there is no remedy for
the attorney. Considering the
manipulation of the grievance process as stated above, this is the ultimate
injustice.
The
problem in my case is that Judge Fry intentionally refused to clarify or modify
his Judgment for Disbarment expecting that he would accomplish a defacto
disbarment lasting at least a couple of years by simply refusing to clarify or
modify his wrongful Judgment for Disbarment. (Judge Fry granted the
Commission’s Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment when the Commission did
not plead all WorldPeace causes of action and did not specifically list all the
elements of the causes of action. The
lawsuit has not been fully adjudicated. Yet
I cannot practice law.) (Cause No. 03-1023)
Rule 4.06
Duties and Authority of the Commisison
“The Commission has the following duties and
responsibilities. (A) To exercise, in lawyer disciplinary and disablility
proceedings only, all rights characteristically resposed in a client by the
common law of this State.”
The
question is, in my lawsuit, should I have counterclaimed against the Commission
for my fees owed to me by Complainants Lang, Apodaca and Collins or should I
have filed a Third Party claim against the Complainant.
Judge Fry in one of the hearings stated that Rule 97a TRCP did not apply
because the Complainants are not Parties. However,
without Rule 4.06 A, the Commission has no privity to sue me for what I
allegedly did against the Complainants. So
the Complainants really are Parties.
This
also gets into the issue of a Rule 41 TRCP severance and sometimes a Rule 174
(b) separate trial issue where it is an abuse of discretion to sever a Rule 97a
compulsory counterclaim. But Rule
97a speaks of Parties and not Complainants.
I
find it interesting that Judge Fry strictly interprets the word Party in
Rule 97a TRCP but ignores the word MUST in Rule 3.01 TRDP.
Rule 15.01
Subpoena Power
An
attorney can assert his rights against self incrimination under this Rule.
The client has a right to his or her file.
If an attorney does not return a file then the Commission must prove up a
Rule 1.15 TDRPC violation. But there
can be no violation of Rule 15.01 because an attorney exercises his rights
against self incrimination and refuses to respond to the Commission.
Rule 1.15 (d) and Rules 1.03 (a
& b) TDRPC.
All
of these rules reference the word “reasonably” or “reasonable” and that
ties back to the Terminology of the TDRPC.
“Reasonable and Reasonably when used in relation to
conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent
lawyer.”
In
the law of legal malpractice, an expert is required to prove up a “reasonably
prudent attorney” The terminology
is the same in the TDRPC as in the legal malpractice law and therefore an expert
should be required by the Commission to prove up the same standard of care with
regards to the TDRPC. (Cause No.
03-1069, 03-1070)
SUMMARY
The
abuse that has been foisted on me in the grievance process is not the exception
but the rule. I am the only
attorney to date who laid the proper foundations and preserved error on all
these abuses by Dawn Miller and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline;
from Mr. Mapes the non attorney determining that I had violated
the TDRPC that he admitted at trial that he did not understand, to the
manipulation of the panels that investigated the grievances against me, to
Dawn Miller, who as per usual believed that she was above the law and added
additional grievances to the underlying disciplinary petition that were not
authorized by Rule 3.01 TRDP, to Judge Fry who refused to sever the
lawsuit per my motion, refused to clarify his disjunctive orders, and attempted
to dismiss a large part of my counterclaims with a “mother hubbard” clause.
This is all business as usual in the grievance process.
The grievance process as it now
exists is arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.
A
lawyer in this state cannot be held to two very distinct bodies of law; the
“suit within a suit” and “but for” legal malpractice elements and the
TDRPC elements. The first makes it
impossible for a client to win a case against an attorney and the second allows
malicious harassment of an attorney by the Complainant through the Commission
based on the most frivolous of grievances. Many
of which are filed simply to get out of paying attorneys fees.
Every
attorney in this state knows that to sue for one’s fees will bring on a
grievance.
The grievance process needs to be
abolished. Not a single rule of the
TRDP that applies to the pre 2.14 TRDP election of a trial de novo can be
enforced by a Respondent attorney.
There
is a presently a question before this court as to whether the most critical part
of the post Rule 2.14 election
can be enforced. (Cause No. 03-0990)
Rule
3.01 TRDP “The Disciplinary Petition MUST be filed with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court of
Respectfully
submitted,
_______________________________
John WorldPeace
2620 Fountainview,
Tel. 713-784-7618
Fax. 713-784-9063
TBA No. 21872800
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was
forwarded to opposing counsel and Judge Fry on
_______________________________
John WorldPeace
EXHIBIT
LIST
A.
Chart of Panel assignment of the grievances against WorldPeace
B.
ORIGINAL ANSWER
JOHN WORLDPEACE V. JOHNELL COLLINS
C.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
STATE BAR OF
D.
WorldPeace’s GRIEVANCE AGAINST MILLER
Attorney for the State Bar
F.
Molleston’s Letter to Judge Fry regarding Judge Fry’s refusal to
enforce the
Judgment for Disbarment
G.
JUDGMENT FOR DISBARMENT
H.
Summary of Grievance’s from WorldPeace’s Webpage
I.
FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST ALVIN ARBUCKLE AND ORDER OF
NON-SUIT OF ALL OTHER DEFENDANTS
COLLINS
V. ARBUCKLE
J. WorldPeace’s RETAINER FEE AGREEMENT with Collins
NO:
03-978, 03-990, 03-1022, 03-1023, 03-1049,
03-1069, 03-1070, 03-1079, 03-1082,
03-1083, 03-1084
IN
THE SUPREME COURT
OF
______________________________
IN
RE:
JOHN
WORLDPEACE
______________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared the affiant, John WorldPeace, who being by me first duly sworn, on his oath stated:
My
name is John WorldPeace, I am over 21 years of age, of sound mind, capable of
making this affidavit and fully competent to testify to the matters stated
herein, have personal knowledge of each of the matters stated herein, and the
facts contained in this affidavit are true.
The
exhibits attached to SHORTHAND RENDITION REGARDING THE PROPOSED
RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE AND THE
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE VS. WORLDPEACE are
true and correct copies of the originals.”
__________________________________
John WorldPeace
SUBSCRIBED
AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this _______ day of _________________, 2003.
____________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE
STATE OF
How can we manifest peace on earth if we do not include everyone (all races, all nations, all religions, both sexes) in our vision of Peace?
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